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Sri Lanka's Termination of Employment of Workmen Act (TEWA) requires that firms with 15 or more
employees justify layoffs and provide generous severance pay to displaced workers, with smaller firms being
exempted. Although formally subject to TEWA, firms in Export Processing Zones (EPZs) may have been
partially exempt from TEWA due to lax enforcement in that sector. A theoretical model shows that firms
subject to TEWA will tend to mass at or below the threshold of 14 workers until they get an atypically large
productivity shock that would propel them beyond the threshold. EPZ firms will be largely unaffected by the
law. In addition, EPZ firms receive preferential tax treatment and exemptions from customs duty.
Consequently, firms that anticipate rapid growth will have an incentive to locate in the EPZ sector. We test
these predictions using 1995-2003 panel data on the universe of all private, formal sector firms in Sri Lanka.
We find that at all sizes, EPZ firms are more likely to add employees than nonEPZ firms. Above the threshold,
nonEPZ firms are more likely to shed workers while EPZ firms are more likely to add workers. Once passing
the threshold, nonEPZ firms grow faster than nonEPZ firms below the threshold, consistent with a theoretical
prediction that only atypically productive nonEPZ firms would cross the threshold. Finally, evidence is
consistent with the hypothesis that TEWA restrictions retard the growth of nonEPZ firms below the
threshold, but only some of the evidence passes tests of statistical significance. The combined impacts of
retarded growth below the threshold, the need for a large productivity shock to cross the threshold, and
slower employment growth above the threshold suggest that the TEWA failed to lower unemployment.
Instead, it slowed employment growth of nonEPZ firms and induced other firms to seek the EPZ sector in
order to evade the law.
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Abstract 
 Sri Lanka's Termination of Employment of Workmen Act (TEWA) requires that firms with 15 
or more employees justify layoffs and provide generous severance pay to displaced workers, 
with smaller firms being exempted. Athough formally subject to TEWA, firms in Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs) may have been partially exempt from TEWA due to  lax enforcement 
in that sector. A theoretical model shows that firms subject to TEWA will tend to mass at or 
below the threshold of 14 workers until they get an atypically large productivity shock that 
would propel them beyond the threshold. EPZ firms will be largely unaffected by the law.  In 
addition, EPZ firms receive preferential tax treatment and exemptions from customs duty.  
Consequently, firms that anticipate rapid growth will have an incentive to locate in the EPZ 
sector.  We test these predictions using 1995-2003 panel data on the universe of all private, 
formal sector firms in Sri Lanka. We find that at all sizes, EPZ firms are more likely to add 
employees than nonEPZ firms.  Above the threshold, nonEPZ firms are more likely to shed 
workers while EPZ firms are more likely to add workers.  Once passing the threshold, nonEPZ 
firms grow faster than nonEPZ firms below the threshold, consistent with a theoretical prediction 
that only atypically productive nonEPZ firms would cross the threshold.  Finally, evidence is 
consistent with the the hypothesis that TEWA restrictions retard the growth of nonEPZ firms 
below the threshold, but only some of the evidence passes tests of statistical significance.  The 
combined impacts of retarded growth below the threshold, the need for a large productivity 
shock to cross the threshold, and slower employment growth above the threshold suggest that the 
TEWA failed  to lower unemployment.  Instead, it  slowed employment growth of nonEPZ firms 
and induced other firms to seek the EPZ sector in order to evade the law. 
                                        
1 Corresponding author is Babatunde Abidoye, Department of Economics, 266 Heady Hall, Iowa State 
University, Ames, IA 50011-1070. Email: babidoye@iastate.edu. Phone: (515) 294-5895. Fax: (515) 294-0221.  ∗  Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011 USA. ∗∗  The World Bank. 
The authors wish to thank the Central Bank of Sri Lanka for providing data, and to Ramani Gunatilaka and Donald 
Parsons for providing useful comments to earlier drafts of the paper. 
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 1  Introduction 
Consistent with its focus on social policies, Sri Lanka has devoted significant attention to 
worker protection. One of the main pillars of its worker protection policy is the Termination of 
Employment of Workman Act (TEWA) introduced in 1971.  The act aims to limit 
unemployment by raising the cost of layoffs.  The act requires that each layoff of a covered 
worker, whether individual or as a part of a mass layoff, must be approved by the government. 
Until recently, the government also decided on a case-by-case basis the level of severance pay 
the firm had to pay to the laid off workers. 
Since its introduction, critics have argued that the TEWA's non-transparent, 
discretionary, and costly regulations discourage employment growth, hinder reallocation of labor 
from inefficient firms to more profitable sectors, slow the introduction of new technologies, and 
increase unemployment. Defenders including trade unions and the government argue that on the 
contrary, severance pay promotes longer-lasting employment relationships that improve 
incentives for training and enhance cooperation and trust between employers and workers. 
Recent microeconometric analyses have shown that labor market regulations can produce 
important efficiency losses. For example, Heckman and Pages (2000) show that in Latin 
America, more stringent job security laws are associated with lower employment and higher 
unemployment, particularly among young workers. Similarly, Besley and Burgess (2004) find 
that labor regulations in India had important adverse effects on output and employment. Ahsan 
and Pages (2007) report that regulations concerned with labor disputes and job security hurt 
covered workers. Bassanini and Duval (2006) find that changes in tax and labor policies explain 
about half of the 1982-2003 changes in unemployment among OECD countries. Other studies 
using macroeconomic data have also found negative efficiency effects of severance pay 
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including Nickell and Layard (1999), Haffner et al (2001), and the OECD (1999). Nevertheless, 
these negative findings from labor market regulations are not universal, particularly those based 
on cross-section analysis (Baker et al, 2005).2   
This paper adds to this literature by identifying the impact of the TEWA on firm 
employment growth in Sri Lanka. We exploit two sources of variation in the way firms are 
treated. First, the law only applies to firms with more than 14 workers, and so smaller firms need 
not comply. Second, firms in Export Processing Zones (EPZ) are said to face lax policy 
enforcement which should lower their firing costs compared to non-EPZ firms.  A third source of 
variation must also be kept in mind: that EPZ firms receive favorable tax benefits and export 
market access that may lead to more rapid firm growth in the EPZ sector.  Consequently, firms 
anticipating rapid growth have an incentive to sort into EPZ status. 
To guide the empirical analysis, we construct a theoretical model showing that firms 
subject to the TEWA will tend to mass at the threshold of 14 workers.  Firms must experience an 
atypically large productivity shock to cross the threshold.  We test these predictions using 1995-
2003 panel data set collected by the Employees' Provident Fund composed of the employment 
histories of every private formal sector firm in Sri Lanka. We employ a difference-in-differences 
method to identify the effects, using firms at or above the threshold as the treatment group, and 
those with fewer than 14 workers and those in EPZs as control groups. 
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that the likelihood of employment 
growth for nonEPZ firms at the threshold is smaller than for those nonEPZ firms above the 
threshold.  In fact, nonEPZ firms that cross the threshold are more likely to shrink while EPZ 
firms above the threshold are more likely to add workers.  Consistent with the prediction that an  
                                        
2 Freeman (2007) presents a review of both theoretical and empirical effects of labor market institutions. Addison 
and Teixeira (2001) review findings regarding the effects of employment protection legislation 
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atypically large productivity shock is required for a nonEPZ firm to cross the employment 
threshold, nonEPZ firms that cross the threshold have more rapid employment growth compared 
to nonEPZ firms below the threshold, and the increase in employment growth is greater for 
nonEPZ firms than for EPZ firms that do not face the tax. Consistent with selection into EPZ 
firms, we find that EPZ firms grow faster than nonEPZ firms regardless of firm size.  However, 
we only find weak evidence of differential growth at the threshold:  EPZ firms with 14 
employees are 7% more likely to add the 15th employee, but the point estimate is not significant.  
Therefore, the evidence is stronger that advantages accorded EPZ firms help them grow faster 
and they sort faster growing firms into the EPZ sector.  However, the weight of the evidence is 
also consistent with the conclusion that TEWA firing costs constrain growth of nonEPZ firms 
also. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an institutional background, 
highlighting the intensions of the TEWA at its introduction, and its the provisions and 
procedures. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and formulates hypotheses to be 
empirically tested.  Section 4 describes the data and the identification strategy devised to identify 
the employment effects of  TEWA. Section 5 presents the empirical results based on the 
estimation of the multinomial model of employment growth of firms. Section 6 concludes with a 
summary and policy recommendations. 
  
2  Institution Background on the TEWA 
The TEWA was enacted at a time when Sri Lanka was pursuing inward-looking 
economic policies, characterized by an import-substitution industrialization policy, stringent 
exchange controls, price controls of many commodities, and a program of nationalization of a 
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wide-range of establishments (Ranaraja 2005).3  Its introduction was intended to arrest the rising 
rate of unemployment which resulted from these policies, as many industries could not operate in 
the restrictive environment and had to reduce or retrench workers.  All terminations of private 
sector workers for any reason other than discipline are covered under the TEWA, including 
redundancies arising from organizational restructuring and financial or economic constraints, 
temporary lay-off, termination as a result of the closure of the business, and even incompetence.4  
TEWA applies to all firms employing 15 or more workers in the 6 month period preceding the 
termination. A worker qualifies as long as he worked at least 180 days in the 12 month period 
preceding the termination. Although all workers in the private sector, subject to eligibility 
criteria, are legally covered by the TEWA, its provisions are difficult to enforce in the informal 
sector. 
The TEWA requires that covered employers must seek the consent of the Commissioner 
General of Labor (CGL) before they are allowed to dismiss a worker, even if it concerns a single 
worker. The CGL may refuse to sanction the layoff or, if permission is granted, the employer 
will be required to pay severance in an amount determined by the CGL. Over the sample period, 
the procedure by which the severance is determined was not specified in law but was subject to a 
lengthy and seemingly arbitrary deliberation.  In December 2003, the TEWA switched to  a 
formula-based severance payment that is uniformly applied to all firms. While that amendment  
eliminated the ad hoc severance,he other elements of the policy including the need for prior 
                                        
3 The rationale for the policy as stated in the Industrial Policy of Ceylon (1971) was that "….the [Government] is 
pledged to the establishment of a socialist society.  This commitment calls for major changes in industrial policy to 
eliminate some of the social and economic consequences of the policy followed in the past few years [such as] the 
concentration of monopoly power in the hands of a few investors, leading to gross inequalities in the distribution of 
income and the entrenchment of privileged groups in society … [and] the heavy reliance of local industry on imported 
raw material, components and technology. . . .".   
4 If termination is the result of misconduct or poor discipline, the employer must inform the worker in writing of the 
reasons for such termination before the second day after such termination, failing which, the worker is entitled to 
seek redress under the TEWA on the basis that the termination of his services was not for disciplinary reasons. 
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approval of layoffs are still in place. 
In dealing with termination applications by employers or complaints by workers, the 
CGL has the power of a District Court to conduct inquiries, such as summoning and compelling 
the attendance of witnesses, production of records, and recording testimony. The employer must 
–satisfy the CGL that terminating the identified group of workers is in the best interest of the 
employer. While the ebvaluation is going on, the workers continue to be paid wages and other 
benefits until the CGL makes a decision, even where there is no work to be done.5 The final 
order of the CGL does not take into consideration the wages paid by the employer during the 
inquiry period. Data for 2003 confirm that the TEWA procedure is a very lengthy one - the 
average processing time of employers' applications was 9.8 months, and it exceeded one year in 
more than 25 percent of cases (World Bank 2007). 
Severance pay was quite generous. During 2002-03, the severance averaged nearly 2 
times the monthly salary per year of service, and the multiple could rise as high as 6 times the 
monthly salary (Figure 1). Judged by international standards, this level of TEWA severance is 
extremely high. Using 2002 data, a year for which we have some data on individual 
compensation, we can infer the relationship between generosity of payments and years of service 
with the firm. As shown in Figure 2, a Sri Lankan worker with 20 years of service received an 
average severance package equal to 29 months of wages. In contrast the average severance was 
16 months of wages in other Asian countries, 12 months in Latin America, 7 months in Africa, 6 
months in the OECD, and 4 months in transition countries. Sri Lankan workers with shorter 
duration of prior service were also awarded much more generous level of severance pay than 
workers in other countries. Since the switch to the fixed severance formula in December 2003, 
the program became has become even more generous (World Bank, 2002). 
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The high turnover costs imposed by the TEWA have led to a relatively small number of 
applications for separations by employers. Between 2000 and 2003, the number of employer 
applications ranged from 71 to 105 per year (World Bank 2007). Less than half of these cases 
were concluded by the order of the commissioner because they were settled " voluntarily" , 
whether because the firm withdrew the application or allowed the worker to retire. Moreover, 
according to a survey of the Employers' Federation of Ceylon (2004), 27 of a total of about 400 
of its private sector members entered voluntary retirement agreements with 3263 workers during 
2001-03 without having first applied for separations through the TEWA. Nevertheless, the 
expected cost of the compensation package that would result from a TEWA proceeding heavily 
influences the terms of these retirement packages. These voluntary retirement packages ranged 
from 6 to 45 months of wages. 
A small number of processed applications for separations do not necessarily mean that 
the TEWA has curtailed separations. Firms may also try to sidestep TEWA obligations by 
contriving disciplinary grounds that would justify firing a worker or else by harassing workers to 
make them quit. Alternatively, they could outsource work to avoid having to take on more 
workers. While it is difficult to assess how frequently these options are used, there are reasons to 
believe that firms have only limited ability to avoid the costs of the TEWA. Inflexible labor 
regulations were one of the five most commonly cited business challenges reported by urban 
firms in Sri Lanka.6  
It is often alleged that TEWA system has not been enforced for firms in Export 
Promotion Zones (EPZs) or that its enforcement for these firms has been lax. If true, then the 
patterns of employment growth and decline would differ between EPZ and non-EPZ firms, a 
                                                                                                                             
5 See Appendix 1 for an example of a protracted retrenchment process in one of the Sri Lankan firms. 
6 The others were an unreliable supply of electricity; uncertain government policy; macroeconomic instability; and 
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possibility we test empirically below.  Furthermore, EPZ firms have other advantages that may 
induce their more rapid growth.  AS EPZ firms get larger, they qualify for tax holidays, 
preferential tax rates, and exemtions from customs duties and foreign exchange limitations.  All 
of these advantages may cause EPZ firms to grow faster, but they may also induce firms with 
better growth prospects to sort into the EPZ group.  
 
3  Theoretical Framework 
We frame our analysis with a model that captures how firms select employment under the 
TEWA system. The firm pays an exogenously set wage tw  to its workers. The firm also needs to 
plan for possible severance and related firing costs, and so we assume it sets aside a proportional 
markup over the wage each period, 0,≥tδ  so that the total per worker cost is ).(1 ttw δ+  For 
simplicity, we assume δδ =t  for all 14>tL  and 0 otherwise. For firms that are not covered by 
the TEWA system, 0.=tδ  
The firm produces output using a short-run decreasing return to scale Cobb-Douglas 
technology.  tL  represents number of workers and A  represent other fixed inputs that are used to 
produce output tQ . The production function takes the form 
 ).(= ατ ttt LAQ  (1) 
The variable tτ  is a permanent exogenous technology shock to labor productivity that is a 
function of past shocks and a random technology innovation variable tη , so that  
 )(exp= 1 ttt ηττ −  (2) 
The tη  is assumed to have mean zero and variance 2ησ  and is an unforeseeable firm-specific 
                                                                                                                             
the high cost of obtaining external financing. 
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technological innovation. The specification for τ  is chosen such that the growth of technology 
shocks to labor is a random process that the firm cannot control. In every period, the firm's 
profit-maximization problem is to select employment so that 
 tttttt LwLAMax )(1=: δτ α +−Π  (3) 
with first order condition: 
 0)(11 ≥+−≡∂
Π∂ −
tttt
t
t wLA
L
δατ α  (4) 
The optimal number of workers at time t  for a given productivity level is defined when the 
condition in (4) holds with equality  
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The optimum number of workers increases in the permanent technology shock tτ  and decreases 
in wage and severance costs. Firms will adjust their employment by comparing their previous 
employment level to the new optimum 
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This expression shows that firms will decide to increase employment depending on the 
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realizations of the random technology innovation variable tη  and an expression that captures the 
change in the cost of hiring labor.   
The TEWA severance cost is illustrated in Figure 3. The first graph shows the total 
annual cost of the severance package as a function of firm employment in period t, .= ttt wLS δ  
The severance cost in period t is zero for firms with less than 15 workers. At 15 workers, the 
firm becomes responsible for turnover costs, and so tS  jumps to .15 twδ  Beyond 15 workers, the 
severance cost rises at twδ  per worker. The second graph shows the marginal change in the 
severance cost as the number of workers changes. Below 15 workers, the cost is zero. At the 15th 
worker, the marginal cost spikes to twδ15 , and then falls to a constant twδ  thereafter. 
Expression (6), coupled by the distribution of severance costs as imposed by the TEWA, 
allows us to distinguish the following cases. 
Case 1: 14.=1−tL  Consider a firm whose optimal employment in 1−t  is at the threshold 
point of 14.=1
∗
−tL The firm would decide to expand in period t  if: 
 0)15(1ln
1
1
1
1
1
≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
−−− −t
t
t w
w δ
αηα  (7) 
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +≥⇒
−1
)15(1ln
t
t
t w
w δη  
So nonEPZ firms that expand past 14 workers require an unusually large unobserved 
technological innovation for them to decide to employ the additional worker. This is because the 
marginal cost of adding the 15th worker is atypically large. Because the firm has to make 
severance payment for all 15 workers in case of mass retrenchment or firm dissolution, the 
marginal cost of adding the 15th worker includes the TEWA tax of δδ 15=t . At 14=1−tL , the 
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TEWA tax was 0.=1−tδ  
Note that many firms will be caught by the inequality in (7) because 
.)15(1ln<
1
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
−t
t
t w
w δη  They will remain at 14 workers until some future period ∗t  at which they 
have accumulated enough positive technological innovation to cross the threshold, that is: 
 )
)(1
(ln>)lnln(
1=
1
−
∗∗
∗
−∗
+≡− ∑
t
tt
i
t
ti
tt w
w δηττ  (8) 
This will not be true for the EPZ firms that may avoid the severance tax. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 1A: For nonEPZ firms at the threshold employment size, 14,=1−tL  the 
likelihood of employment growth is smaller than for nonEPZ firms above the threshold. 
Hypothesis 1B: At the threshold employment size, 14,=1−tL  the likelihood of employment 
growth is greater for EPZ than for nonEPZ firms. 
Two caveats are warranted. First, the optimum firm size for nonEPZ firms under the 
constraint that employment will be less than 15 due to TEWA costs. Therefore, we do not add 
the prediction that the likelihood of nonEPZ employment growth at 14,=1−tL  will be less than 
employment growth at 141 <−tL .  We discuss the role of constrained optimal employment under 
Case 4.  Second, the nonEPZ firms with optimal employment above  the hurdle of the 14th 
worker will have to experience the large productivity shock shown in equation (8) and therefore, 
these firms will be expected to be  more productive on average than EPZ firms at the time they 
pass that hurdle. We will comment on the importance of this observation in our discussion of 
Case 5.. 
Case 2: .14<1−tL  For a non-EPZ or EPZ firm with less than 14 workers, the firm would 
decide to expand in period t if 
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This is the usual value of marginal productivity condition where the firm will decide to hire if the 
value of the marginal product of the extra worker is higher than the cost to the firm. Therefore, in 
the absence of the constraints mentioned above, we have   
 Hypothesis 2: At 14<1−tL , the likelihood of employment growth  is the same for EPZ and 
nonEPZ firms. 
Case 3: 15.>1−tL  The condition for firm size expansion is similar to that of case 1. With 
constant severance tax ,== 1 δδδ −tt  the productivity shock needed to hire an extra worker is  
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛
+
+
−−− 111
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t
tt
tt
t w
w
w
w
δ
δη  (10) 
Therefore the probability that a given firm will increase employment is the same under cases 1 
and 3. This is true even for EPZ firms. The reason is that EPZ firms have a lower average level 
of productivity in period 1−t  than do equally sized nonEPZ firms according to equation (8). The 
same magnitude multiplicative productivity shock is required for employment growth for both 
EPZ and nonEPZ firms. This implies: 
Hypothesis 3: At 14>1−tL , the likelihood of employment growth is the same for EPZ and 
nonEPZ firms. 
These hypotheses are derived from a highly stylized set of assumptions regarding production and 
costs that presume capital is Hicks neutral and that costs per unit of labor are unaffected by the 
existence of the constraint.  Relaxing these assumptions yields weaker hypotheses that may 
better reflect better the Sri Lankan reality:  
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Case 4:  The employment tax at 15≥tL  limits capital investments for nonEPZ firms, but 
tax and export advantage raise capital investments for EPZ firms . 
It is possible that the large tax imposed as firms grow beyond 14 workers serves as an 
effective constraint on firm size, but it does not follow that the constrained optimum employment 
will be at 14.=tL  Prohibited from growing beyond 14 workers, the optimal nonEPZ firm size 
may be anywhere in the range [1,14]. As a result, nonEPZ firms may stop growing at 
employment levels below 14 workers. 
This tendency is reinforced by the sorting effect of the TEWA legislation. If firms whose 
capital investment would optimally utilize more than 14 workers have an incentive to locate in 
the Export Processing Zones, fast growth firms will sort disproportionately into the EPZ sector. 
These effects are reinforced by the other advantages given EPZ firms that raise returns to capital 
in that sector.  As a result, we can modify our hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2A : At 14<1−tL , EPZ firms grow faster than nonEPZ firms. 
Hypothesis  3A At:  14>1−tL , EPZ firms grow faster than EPZ firms. 
Case 5:  Serially correlated technology shocks ( 0)>),( 1−ttcov τη  
In the world of technology, luck may beget luck. Firms that attracted positive technology 
shocks in the past may be more likely to experience them again in the future. For example, Rose 
and Joskow (1990) show that the largest firms tend to introduce new technologies earlier, one 
possible source of their growth thus being the serial correlation in technology shocks. This 
suggests that if 0>),( 1−ttcov τη , then 
Hypothesis 4: For both nonEPZ and EPZ firms, employment growth is faster above than 
below 14.=1−tL  
  14
Note that serial correlation in technology shock introduces a new form of sorting for 
nonEPZ firms. While firms that expect to grow beyond 14 workers would sort into the EPZ 
sector, nonEPZ firms that grow beyond 14 workers face a much larger technology hurdle than 
their EPZ counterparts in order to pay the TEWA imposed 15δ  tax. As noted above, nonEPZ 
firms that pass the threshold will have an atypically large draw on τ  compared to nonEPZ firms 
below the threshold, and they would be expected to grow atypically rapidly as a result. EPZ 
firms that do not face the 15δ  tax would grow more rapidly because of the serial correlation in 
productivity, but the increase in the growth rate would be larger among nonEPZ firms. 
Hypothesis 5: If 0,>),( 1−ttcov τη  then the difference in employment growth between the  
firms above the employment size threshold, and at or below the threhsold, is greater for nonEPZ 
than for EPZ firms. 
 
4  Estimating the threshold effect 
With the guidance provided by the above theoretical framework, below we describe the available 
data on Sri Lankan firms and present the strategy to identify the effects of the TEWA system. 
4.1  Data Description 
In our empirical analysis, we make use of a unique panel data set that includes annual 
employment data for 80,560 firms in Sri Lanka over the 1995-2003 period. The period coincides 
with a consistent set of restrictions on layoffs.  Those policies were relaxed modestly at the end 
of 2003.  The data are compiled by the Sri Lanka Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) on all 
private sector firms and workers paying contributions to the fund. The data are maintained by the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka. All registered firms regardless of size are required to pay 
contributions for their workers. The data are quite limited, however. Apart from the number of 
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workers employed during the year, the only other information contained in the database is the 
firm's name and region: each firm is designated as having a base in one of 24 regions. The name 
allows us to identify which firms belong to an export processing zone. The Sri Lankan Board of 
Investment provided us a list of names for firms that operate in EPZs. We matched these names 
with 1,124 firms in the EPF list, and these firms comprise our EPZ group. 
The EPF data are not free of problems. The data set only contains workers for whom the 
firm paid contributions during the year. If for whatever reason such contributions are not paid, 
the true number of workers in the firm will deviate from the number reported to the EPF. The 
most frequent reason for such discrepancies is the presence of financial difficulties that prevent a 
firm from paying contributions in the current year. Even delayed payments are not used to 
correct the data retrospectively. Therefore, these employment numbers will only reflect the 
contemporaneously reported number of workers for whom the firm is making an EPF 
contribution. The frequency or magnitude of this measurement error is not known. 
The nature of the data does not allow us to differentitate between quits and layoffs and so 
we assume that any net loss of workers is due to layoffs. This seems reasonable as workers who 
quit will presumably be replaced, resulting in no employment loss. Our empirical work focuses 
on the direction of change in employment (i.e. falling, staying the same, or rising) rather than the 
reported change in the number employed. We expect that the direction of change will be subject 
to less error than the number, although we have no way of validating that presumption. In 
addition, as will be made apparent, the dichotomous or trichotomous indicators of employment 
change will fit the theoretical model more closely than would the change in employment because 
of the role of the marginal cost of increasing workers. The threshold matters for whether the firm 
increases employment at all, but less so for employing additional workers beyond the threshold. 
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Table 1 provides summary information on the size distribution of firms in EPZ and 
nonEPZ regions. The differences are striking. Only 22.5% of EPZ firms have fewer than 14 
workers compared to 75.6% of nonEPZ firms! In contrast, the EPZ firms are over 3 times more 
likely than nonEPZ firms to have grown beyond the threshold employment level. It certainly 
appears that the incentives to grow must differ between the two groups of firms. 
There are also apparent differences in the probability that firms will increase or decrease 
their workforce. NonEPZ firms are much more likely than EPZ firms to reduce or maintain their 
current employment level, regardless of size. EPZ firms are much more likely to add to their 
employment base. The largest contrast in probability of growth is below the threshold: the 
smallest EPZ firms are twice as likely to increase employment compared to nonEPZ firms. 
Comparing the distribution of employment by firm size in Sri Lanka with that in other 
developing countries (Table 2) also shows evidence consistent with atypically large barriers to 
employment or firm growth in nonEPZ regions. Of 15 countries for which we can find 
comparable data, Sri Lanka has the fifth highest proportion of workers in firms with fewer than 
ten workers and the second lowest fraction of workers in firms with over 49 workers. The reason 
for the relatively large employment share for Sri Lanka's small firms lies entirely in the nonEPZ 
regions. In fact, the distribution of employment across Sri Lanka's EPZ firms is in marked 
contrast to the overall pattern: of all the countries for which we have size-distribution 
information, Sri Lanka's EPZ firms have the smallest fraction of workers in firms with fewer 
than 10 workers and the largest fraction of workers in firms with over 49 workers. 
Tables 1 and 2 reveal substantial differences in average firm size and growth patterns 
consistent with differences in the marginal cost of hiring across the EPZ and nonEPZ regions. To 
evaluate the strength of that correlation more formally, we next propose and implement an 
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empirical test that is consistent with the theoretical model presented above. Table 2 presents the 
percentage distribution of employment by firm size in the formal sector for Sri Lanka and some 
other countries.  
 
 4.2  Identification Strategy 
To isolate the effects of severance pay on employment growth of firms, we employ a 
difference-in-differences method, using firms at or above the severance threshold as the 
treatment group, and those with fewer than 14 workers and those in EPZs as control groups. The 
first control group follows naturally from the design of the TEWA system, because the 
regulations do not apply to firms employing less than 15 workers. The second control group is 
formed based on the assumption that enforcement is ineffective in EPZs, allowing firms to 
escape paying separation costs as dictated by TEWA -- the assumption tested empirically below. 
Before formulating precise empirical tests, it is instructive to examine the distribution of 
firms by size and by growth rates in the neighborhood of the employment threshold of 14. Figure 
4 shows the average number of firms covered by the TEWA law by employment size. In general, 
the number of firms decreases as employment size increases. The pattern of data in Figure 4 does 
not support an undue cost of hiring the 15th worker in that we might have expected a spike at 14 
workers. Instead, there are fewer firms at 14 workers than at 13 workers.7    
To better isolate a potential effect of the TEWA, it is thus useful to study the fraction of 
firms which are growing by firm size, as shown in Figure 5. While the likelihood of employment 
growth rises as firm size increases from 12 to 17 workers, it falls to 33 percent for firms with 14 
workers, compared to 35 percent for firms with 13 workers and to 36 percent for firms with 15 
workers. This graphical representation gives an indication that firms at the 14 worker threshold 
                                        
7 This pattern of the size distribution of firms holds generally across regions that are covered by the TEWA law, and 
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may be refraining from growing in order to avoid the severance cost. 
Figure 5 illustrates the identification method of TEWA effects we formulate below. We 
can also utilize EPZ firms that are potentially exempt from the policy as additional controls.. Our 
theoretical model suggests that firm emplyment growth depends on the magnitude of a random 
productivity shock compared to the change in the cost of hiring labor. Presumed differences in 
the marginal cost of increasing employment by prior firm size and by whether the firm is inside 
or outside an EPZ region underlie the hypotheses laid out above. Straightforward tests of these 
hypotheses can be conducted by examining the differences in probability of employment growth 
across firm sizes and across the two regions. By equation (6), a firm will expand if  
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so we report the pattern for the country as a whole. 
8 Ashenfelter and Card (1982) showed that wages evolve according to an AR(1) process with first-order coefficient  
insignificabntly different from 1, and so the random walk assumption is not a radical departure from reality. 
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We estimate two variants of (13). In MODEL 1, we examine the choice to grow 
( 3)=itIΔ  versus the alternative to decrease employment or stay the same ( 3).<itIΔ 9  In 
MODEL 2, we further differentiate between the last two options, ( 2)=itIΔ  versus ( 1).=itIΔ  
MODEL 2 allows us to investigate whether firms above the threshold are more likely to shed 
workers in order to fall back into exempt status compared to workers who are below the 
threshold. 
To operationalize (13), we assume that the cumulative distribution of itε  is logistic. We 
also need to specify the marginal cost of increasing employment. We assume that  
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This specification relates to the theoretical marginal cost in (6) as follows: The constant 
0β  corresponds to the base case which is conveniently set to be 14=1−itL  in a nonEPZ region. 
That is the case with the highest marginal cost of employment δδ 15=t . The 1)( −itkD  are 
dummy variables indicating the number of workers at firm i  in year 1,−t  ranging from one to 
more than five hundred workers. We would expect that dummy variables corresponding to 
                                        
9 We could also derive a continuous rather than a discrete empirical model  of employment growth, but the discrete 
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14<1−itL  would be cases with low marginal costs of raising employment and dummy variables 
corresponding to 14>1−itL  would be cases with marginal costs of employment δδ =t . The 
coefficient kβ  determines whether the firm of size k are more likely to add workers relative to 
firms with 14 workers. We use the notations −kβ  and +kβ  to designate employment changes 
made below and above the threshold respectively. `EPZ' indicates the firm is in an export 
promotion zone with an associated coefficient EPZβ  that measures the difference in employment 
growth for EPZ relative to nonEPZ firms. Similarly, kγ  measures any added employments effect 
for EPZ firms in a particular size class .k  Coefficient notation −kγ  and +kγ  correspond to below 
and above the 14 worker threshold. Table 3 summarizes the identification and interporetation of 
the coefficients.  The first column shows the parameters describing firm growth for EPZ firms 
below, at and above the threshold. The second column shows the corresponding parameter 
estimates for nonEPZ firms. The first differences of the nonEPZ estimates allow us to identify 
−kβ  and .+kβ  The double difference allows us to identify −kγ  and .+kγ  
0>−kβ  indicates faster growth than the base case for nonEPZ firms below 14 workers. 
Similarly, 0>+kβ  indicates faster employment growth than the base case for nonEPZ firms 
above 14 workers. 0>−+ kEPZ γβ  indicates that EPZ firms are growing faster than nonEPZ firms 
below 14 workers and 0>++ kEPZ γβ  indicates that EPZ firms are growing faster than nonEPZ 
firms above 14 workers. The coefficient EPZβ  tells us if EPZ firms grow faster than nonEPZ 
firms at the threshold. These coefficient estimates form the basis of our hypothesis tests. 
 
                                                                                                                             
formulation better matches the  the marginal decision of whether to add a worker. 
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5  Results 
In Tables 4 and 5, we present the results of the estimation of Model 1 which compares the 
decision to increase employment { itlΔ  3= } against the option to either retain or lower 
employment from current staffing levels { 1,2=itlΔ }. We treat the latter as the base case. All 
coefficients are converted into marginal effects to aid interpretation. Table 4 presents the most 
detailed sets of results, while Table 5 presents a more parsimonious representation that averages 
decisions below and above the threshold employment level of 14 workers. The conclusions are 
consistent across the two tables, and so we will focus our comments on the more abbreviated set 
of results from Table 5.  
It is convenient to discuss the results of Model 2 at the same time as we discuss the 
related issues using the results from Tables 4 and 5. Because Model 2, which contrasts the 
decision to increase employment { itlΔ  =3} versus not changing employment { itlΔ  =2} versus 
lowering employment { itlΔ  =1}, is quite complex, it is more difficult to interpret. Therefore, we 
convert the results to their implied transition probabilities which are reported in Table 6. The 
original coefficient estimates for Model 2 are reported in the Appendix. 
Result 1: NonEPZ firms above the threshold are 5.4% more likely to add workers than 
are nonEPZ firms at the threshold employment size, 14,=1−tL  and so Hypothesis 1A is 
confirmed.  The employment growth advantage for firms above the threshold ranges from 3 
percentage points for firms with 15 to 20 workers; 5-6 percentage points for firms with 21-35 
workers;  6-8 percentage points for firms with 36-249 workers, and to 3 percentage points for 
firms above 250 workers.   
EPZ firms at the threshold have a 6.9 percentage point higher likelihood of employment 
growth relative to nonEPZ firms at the threshold, consistent with Hypothesis 1B, but the estimate 
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is imprecise.  Because we cannot reject that  βEPZ = 0, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 1B.  
Our test of Hypothesis 1B is compromised by the very small number of EPZ firms 
observed at the threshold, Nevertheless, as shown in Table 4, there is substantial evidence 
consistent with slower growth of nonEPZ firms at the threshold than for EPZ firms at 15, 16, 17, 
and 18 employess.  The growth advantage of EPZ firms above 14 employees relative to nonEPZ 
firms at the threshold is 12.6% and highly significant.  Furthermore, the pattern of predicted 
transition probabilities in Table 6 suggests sharp differences in employment growth between 
EPZ and nonEPZ firms. EPZ firms at the threshold are 23% more likely to add employment and 
15% less likely to shrink compared to their nonEPZ counterparts at the threshold. 
Result 2: At 14,<1−tL  the likelihood of employment growth is statistically significantly higher 
for EPZ than nonEPZ firms, −kγ(  +  0>)EPZβ . Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is rejected but 
Hypothesis 2A is confirmed.  As shown in Table 5, EPZ firms below the threshold are 21 
percentage points more likely to add workers compared to nonEPZ firms below the threshold. In 
Table 6, nonEPZ firms below the threshold are 11% more likely to keep employment at the same 
level or shrink in the following year, while in contrast, EPZ firms below the threshold are 10% 
more likely to grow.  
 The slower growth of small nonEPZ firms suggests that the large cost imposed by TEWA for 
hiring 15 or more workers can constrain employment growth at all levels of employment below 
15 and not just the choice of hiring the 15th worker per se.  As discussed in Case 4, the 
constrained employment optimum may not be at 14 woprkers but can be anywhere in the range 
[1, 14].  Our findings suggests that the TEWA has retarded employment growth for nonEPZ 
firms at all employment levels below 15.  
 Result 3: At 14>1−tL , EPZ firms grow faster than nonEPZ firms {(  +kγ  +  >)EPZβ  0} . 
  23
Hypothesis 3 is rejected, but hypothesis 3A is confirmed.   EPZ firms above the threshold have 
employment growth probabilities 12.6 percentage points greater than for similarly sized nonEPZ 
firms.  Turning to Table 6, we find that EPZ firms grow with probability 0.52, while nonEPZ 
firms grow with probability 0.39.  Interestingly, 56% of nonEPZ firms above the threshold shed 
workers compared to only 45% of EPZ firms, suggesting that nonEPZ firms may have a greater 
incentive to drop back below the threshold in order to avoid the tax. 
Result 4: Combining Results 2 and 3, we have that EPZ firms are more likely to grow than are 
nonEPZ firms of all sizes.  This is most easily apparent in the comparisons between EPZ and 
nonEPZ firms in the right-most column of Table 6.  Regardless of firm size, the probability of 
employment growth is largest for EPZ firms.  That explains why in Table 1, firms are much 
more likely to exceed 14 employees in the EPZ than in the nonEPZ sector. 
Result 5: For both nonEPZ and EPZ firms, employment growth is faster above than below the 
employment threshold size, 14=1−tL −+ kk ββ >{  and )}(>)( −−++ ++ kkkk γβγβ . Hypothesis 4 is 
thus confirmed.  Table 5 shows that, once passing the threshold, nonEPZ firm employment 
growth is nearly 17 percentage points greater than for nonEPZ firms below the threshold.  EPZ 
firms above the threshold have employment growth probabilities 8 percentage points above that 
of EPZ firms below the threshold.  Both results are consistent with the existence of serial 
correlation in the productivity shock that would lead to more rapid expansion  as firm size 
increases, at least in the range of firm sizes below 500 workers. 
Result 6: The difference in employment growth between the firms above versus below the 
threshold is greater for nonEPZ than for EPZ firms. Hypothesis 5 is confirmed.The increase in 
employment growth rate between firms above and at the threshold is 8.6 percentage points larger 
for nonEPZ than for EPZ firms. .  Our results support the hypothesis that nonEPZ firms below 
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the threshold are atypically hindered from growing and that those that pass the threshold require 
an atypically large draw on τ  that enables them to grow more rapidly after passing the threshold.  
Importantly, these results are consistent with the existence of real effects of the TEWA threshold 
tax retarding growth of nonEPZ firms below the threshold.  Even though we cannot reject that  
βEPZ = 0, the weight of the other evidence confirms that nonEPZ firm growth is constrained by 
the TEWA law.  
 
6  Conclusion 
Numerous studies have explained the effect of labor market restriction on unemployment, 
employment growth and wage inequality in OECD countries. This study extends this inquiry to 
the case of the TEWA program imposing severance costs on firms with 15 or more workers in 
Sri Lanka. Our theoretical framework provides valuable insight into how firms behave when 
faced with EPL. 
Using a discrete choice framework to analyze Sri Lanka's severance pay system (TEWA), 
our results show that the presence of firing cost significantly distorts hiring decisions. Covered 
firms appear to have retarded employment growth at or below 14 workers compared to exempt 
firms.  NonEPZ firms that manage to pass the 14 worker threshold grow faster, consistent with a 
presumption that only atypically productive nonEPZ firms can afford to employ more than 14 
workers.  EPZ firms exempt from the TEWA grow faster than nonEPZ firms at all levels of 
employment, presumably because they are not constrained by the law and/or the firms 
anticipating rapid employment growth atypically enter Export Processing Zones.   The only 
departure from expectations is that at the threshold, the employment growth advantage for EPZ 
over nonEPZ firms is not statistically significant, although the point estimate is positive as 
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expected. 
The evidence that the TEWA system affects vital aspects of firm behavior suggests that 
the system negatively affects the growth of firms subject to the law.  In doing so, the law fails in 
its goal of increasing employment by imposing large layoff costs and severance taxes.  These 
results suggest that several aspects of the TEWA system need to be reexamined. Options to be 
evaluated include (i) reducing the generosity of the severance package as well as regularizing the 
amount; (ii) allowing firms to lay off workers without prior consent of the Commissioner;  and 
(iii) excluding the coverage of worker incompetence under the TEWA.  In addition, the positive 
effects of EPZ tax and export benefits on firm employment growth suggest that these benefits 
should be made generally available to all firms rather than limiting their application to only a 
subset of firms. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Sri Lanka firms by initial size, change in employment over the years, and EPZ status, 
1995-2003 
      
EPZ Firms Percent of sample Shrink Stay Grow Total 
Less than 14 employees 22.5% 29.3% 26.7% 44.0% 100.0% 
14 employees 1.1% 45.8% 13.6% 40.7% 100.0% 
More than 14 employees 76.4% 45.4% 2.2% 52.4% 100.0% 
N=5,441      
      
non EPZ Firms Percent of sample Shrink Stay Grow Total 
Less than 14 employees 75.6% 37.2% 40.8% 22.0% 100.0% 
14 employees 1.2% 53.9% 13.2% 32.9% 100.0% 
More than 14 employees 23.2% 55.8% 5.1% 39.1% 100.0% 
N=320,866      
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Table 2:  Percent distribution of employment by firm size in formal sector firms, Sri Lanka 
and various other countries 
 
Sri Lanka, 1995-2003 <10 employees 10 to 49 
employees 
>49 employees 
Total  68 20 12 
NonEPZ firms only 69 20 11 
EPZ firms only 17 26 57 
    
Other countries    
Sierra Leone – 1974a 90 5 5 
Ghana – 1970a 84 1 15 
Zambiaa 83 1 16 
Indonesiaa 77 7 16 
Honduras – 1979a 68 8 24 
Philippines – 1974a 66 5 29 
Nigeria – 1972a 59 26 15 
Thailand – 1978a 58 11 31 
Tanzania – 1967a 56 7 37 
Colombia – 1973a 52 13 35 
Kenya – 1969a 49 10 41 
India-1971a 42 20 38 
Korea – 1975a 40 7 53 
Jamaica – 1978a 35 16 49 
    
Venezuela  (1998)b 0.20 3.90 95.8 
Slovenia (2000)b 12.9 14.7 72.4 
Romania (2000)b 12.5 14.7 72.8 
Mexico (2000)b 13.8 17.6 68.5 
Latvia (1998)b 18.2 23.4 58.3 
Hungary (2000)b 12.8 20.3 66.7 
Estonia (2000)b 15.1 29.1 55.8 
Brazil (2000)b 9.3 21.3 69.4 
Argentina (2001)b 18.1 22.4 59.5 
Note: Sri Lanka based on authors' computations. 
a- Data from Liedholm and Mead (1987, Table 3). 
b- Data from HSS. 
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Table 3: Parameters controling the probability of employment growth by type of firms 
Employment in 
period 1.−t  
Type of firm  
    EPZ   Non EPZ   Difference  
13≤   −− +++ kEPZk γβββ0   −+ kββ0   ( )−+ kEPZ γβ   
14   EPZββ +0    0β    EPZβ   
 Difference   ( )−− + kk γβ    −kβ    −kγ   
≤ 15  ++ +++ kEPZk γβββ0   ++ kββ0   ( )++ kEPZ γβ   
14   EPZββ +0    0β    EPZβ   
 Difference   ( )++ + kk γβ    +kβ    +kγ   
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Table 4. Parameter estimates of the likelihood that the firm will increase employment compared to 
reducing it or keeping it unchanged. 
 Model 1 
Variables yit=3 vs 1 or 2 
No. of workers (k) Coefficient (βk) Std. errors 
βk = 1   -.1795 .0045 
βk = 2   -.1282 .0050 
βk = 3   -.0897 .0056 
βk = 4   -.0759 .0058 
βk = 5   -.0545 .0063 
βk = 6-7   -.0338 .0066 
βk = 8-9   -.0140 .0071 
βk = 10-11   0.0020 .0076 
βk =12   0.0040 .0089 
βk=13    0.0147 .0094 
βk=14    - - 
βk=15    0.0264 .0102 
βk=16    0.0269 .0106 
βk=17   0.0300 .0109 
βk=18-20   0.0345 .0089 
βk=21-25   0.0472 .0089 
βk=26-35   0.0616 .0087 
βk=36-99   0.0802 .0082 
βk=100-249   0.0619 .0084 
βk=250-499   0.0256 .0087 
βk>500   0.0321 .0090 
βEPZ   0.0682 .0580 
k≤11 in EPZ (γ11-)   0.0995 .0626 
k=12 in EPZ (γ12)   0.0849 .0795 
k=13 in EPZ (γ13)   0.0799 .0802 
k=15 in EPZ (γ15)   0.0578 .0861 
k=16 in EPZ (γ16)   0.1645 .0939 
k=17 in EPZ (γ17)   0.0996 .0906 
k=18 in EPZ (γ18+)   0.0413 .0558 
Test for differences in employment growth rate between groups. 
Hypothesis Estimate p-value Hypothesis p-value 
(βEPZ + γ11-) = 0 0.1677 0.000 (β11- + γ11-) = 0 0.7344 
(βEPZ + γ12) = 0 0.1531 0.002 (β12 + γ12) = 0 0.2212 
(βEPZ + γ13) = 0 0.1481 0.003 (β13 + γ13) = 0 01949 
βEPZ  = 0 0.0682 0.240 - - 
(βEPZ + γ15) = 0 0.126 0.039 (β15 + γ15) = 0 0.2905 
(βEPZ + γ16) = 0 0.2327 0.000 (β16 + γ16) = 0 0.0203 
(βEPZ + γ17) = 0 0.1678 0.006 (β17 + γ17) = 0 0.1102 
(βEPZ + γ18+) = 0 0.1095 0.000 (β18+ + γ18+) = 0 0.0804 
Note: Dependent variable: Indicator variable taking the value of 1 if employment increases and o 
otherwise. Logistic regression estimates given. Marginal effect with the size of employment equal to 14 
and being a nonEPZ firm as the baseline. Bold values are significant at 5%. 
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 Table 5: Estimate for MODEL 1 regrouped to test for differences in employment 
growth rate below and above the threshold. 
Variables   Marginal Effect   std. errors  
 L ≤−1t  13 in EPZ )( EPZkk βγβ ++ −−    0.0996    0.0155   
L ≤−1t  13 in nonEPZ )( −kβ    .1127−    0.0076   
L =1t−  14 in EPZ )( EPZβ  - Hypothesis 1B  0.0693    0.0590   
L =1t−  14 in nonEPZ )( 14β  (reference).   −    −   
L ≥−1t  15 in EPZ )( EPZkk βγβ ++ ++    0.1802    0.0115   
L ≥−1t  15 in nonEPZ )( +kβ    0.0538    0.0073   
Test of Hypothesis 
 Hypothesis   Estimate   P-value  
Hypothesis 1A:  H0: )( 14ββ >+k   0.0538    0.0073   
 Hypothesis 1B: 0)(:0 =EPZH β    0.0693  0.24 
 Hypothesis 2A : 0)(:0 =+− EPZkH βγ    0.2123    0.998   
 Hypothesis 3A: 0)(:0 =++ EPZkH βγ    0.1264    0.999   
 Hypothesis 4: )}(>){(
)>(
:0
−−++
−+
++
kkkk
kkH γβγβ
ββ
  
  0.1665 
 
  0.0806 
 1.0 
 
1.0 
 Hypothesis 5: 0<)(:0 −+ − kkH γγ    -0.0859  0.999  
 Note: Dependent variable: Indicator variable taking the value of 1 if employment increases 
and 0 otherwise. Logistic regression estimates given. Logistic regression estimates give. Base 
case is 14 workers for a nonEPZ firm. Bold values are significant at 5%. 
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  Table 6. Predicted transition probability at each employment category.  
 Group   Shrink   Stay the same   Grow  
 EPZ  below the threshold  
 
8]0.268,0.31[
0.293
   
2]0.242,0.29[
0.267
   
7]0.412,0.46[
0.440
 
 nonEPZ  below the threshold  
 
4]0.370,0.37[
0.372
   
0]0.406,0.41[
0.408
   
2]0.218,0.22[
0.220
 
 EPZ  at the threshold  
 
5]0.331,0.58[
0.458
   
3]0.048,0.22[
0.136
   
2]0.281,0.53[
0.407
 
 nonEPZ  at the threshold  
 
5]0.523,0.55[
0.539
   
3]0.121,0.14[
0.132
   
4]0.314,0.34[
0.329
 
 EPZ  above the threshold  
 
9]0.439,0.46[
0.454
   
6]0.017,0.02[
0.022
   
9]0.509,0.53[
0.524
 
 nonEPZ  above the threshold  
 
1]0.554,0.56[
0.558
   
3]0.049,0.05[
0.051
   
5]0.388,0.39[
0.391
 
 95% confidence intervals in brackets.  
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Figure 1: Generosity of TEWA orders and compensation index, 2002-03 
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Source: Author’s computations based on the information provided by the Commissioner. 
Notes: The index of generosity is the multiple of the monthly salary per year of work service, above computed from 
the TEWA orders for firms; compensation index is the multiple of the monthly salary awarded to workers, above 
computed from compensation awarded to workers in 2002. 
 
 
Figure 2: International comparison of the generosity of 
severance pay
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Source:  Author’s computation, for Sri Lanka; Holzmann, Iyer and Vodopivec (2003), for other countries.  
Note: simulated generosity levels for Sri Lanka (inferred from a regression based on data for workers who received 
compensation in 2002), stipulated generosity levels as prescribed by compensation formulas in other countries. 
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Figure 4: Annual number of firms covered by TEWA, by number of employees, 
1995-2003
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Figure 5: Share of firms covered by TEWA that increased employment during 
the year,  by number of employees at the start of the year, 1995-2003 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: An example of real world retrenchment: Shell Gas Lanka  
 
Shell Gas Lanka decided to close down one division of the company and filed an application for 
a retrenchment of 17 workers on April 18, 2001. The Commissioner General of Labor concluded 
the cross-examination by November 2001, and issued the order approving application on 
December 2, 2003 – two years and a half after its filing (in the meantime, the 17 workers 
remained employed and continued to be paid, although de facto they did not work). The order 
allowed the company to proceed with layoffs of all 17 workers, contingent on paying them: 
• to workers with more than 10.5 years of service: 4.5 monthly wages times the sum of 
years of their service with the company plus the years of future service until normal 
retirement, with the ceiling of 90 monthly wages; and  
• to workers with less than 10.5 years of service: 3.5 monthly wages times the sum of years 
of their service with the company plus the years of future service until normal retirement, 
with the ceiling of 70 monthly wages. 
 
During the retrenchment, process, the company has frozen hiring except at the highest level. 
(Shell Gas was privatized in1995 under the clause of no retrenchment, and in the late 1990s 
reduced its staff via voluntary retirement programs, offering on average about 74 monthly 
wages.) 
 
Source:  Vodopivec (2004). 
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  Table A1: Test for differences in growth rate between groups (Model 1).  
 Hypothesis   Estimate   Chi-
square  
0=)(; 14=(L and  13)(L
 withfirms nonEPZbetween growth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t −−− ≤ kβ
 
 0.1127−    222.01   
0=)(14);=(L and ) 15(L
 withfirms nonEPZbetween growth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t +−− ≥ kβ
 
 0.0538    53.73   
 
0=)(
  13);(L and 15)(L
 withfirms nonEPZbetween growth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t
−+
−−
−
≤≥
kk
ββ
 
 0.1665   8455.52   
0=)( 14);=(L and ) 13(L
 withfirms EPZbetween growth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t −−−− +≤ kk γβ
  
 0.0303    0.25   
0=)( ); 14=(L and ) 15(L
 withfirms EPZbetween growth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t ++−− +≥ kk γβ
  
 0.1109    3.15   
0=)()(
 ); 13(L and ) 15(L
 withfirms EPZbetween growth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t
−+−+
−−
−+−
≤≥
kkkk
γγββ
  
 0.0806    26.89   
 
0=)(;
}1315{
}1315{
)firms nonEPZ EPZandfor   threshold theabove
and belowgrowth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
11
11
−+
−−
−− −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
≤−≥
−≤−≥
kk
tt
tt
nonEPZinLnonEPZinL
inEPZLinEPZL γγ
  
 0.0859−    53.91   
Note: Dependent variable: Indicator variable taking the value of 1 if employment increases and 0 otherwise. 
Logistic regression estimates give. Base case is 14 workers for a nonEPZ firm. Bold values are significant at 5%. 
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Table A2:  The estimated impact of TEWA on employment growth at different employment levels. 
Multinomial logit estimation. All results are converted to marginal effects.  Model 2 
 Variables    Shrink   Stay the same   Grow  
 )rs(No.ofworke k    coefficient  std.errors  coefficient   std. errors  coefficient   std. errors  
 1=kβ    -.2975   .0075   0.5076  .0100   -.2102  .0051  
2=kβ    -.2569   .0081   0.4234  .0111   -.1665  .0057  
3=kβ    -.2146   .0086   0.3446  .0119   -.1300  .0063  
4=kβ    -.1640   .0092   0.2765  .0123   -.1125  .0066  
5=kβ    -.1344   .0095   0.2209  .0125   -.0865  .0071  
76= −kβ    -.1002   .0093   0.1584  .0118   -.0581  .0074  
98= −kβ    -.0590   .0096   0.0876  .0114   -.0287  .0079  
1110= −kβ    -.0417   .0097   0.0481  .0111   -.0064   .0084  
12=kβ    -.0161   .0113   0.0146   .0122   0.0015   .0098  
13=kβ    -.0113   .0117   -.0044   .0123   0.0157   .0104  
14=kβ    -   -   -   -   -   -  
15=kβ    -.0076   .0124   -.0235   .0126   0.0311  .0113  
16=kβ    -.0108   .0128   -.0202   .0131   0.0310  .0116  
17=kβ    .0050   .0131   -.0437  .0128   0.0387  .0120  
2018= −kβ    .0221   .0106   -.0707  .0095   0.0485  .0098  
2521= −kβ    .0207   .0102   -.0853  .0087   0.0646  .0097  
3526= −kβ    .0292   .0098   -.1149  .0074   0.0857  .0095  
9936= −kβ    .0557   .0091   -.1751  .0051   0.1194  .0090  
249100= −kβ    .1084   .0096   -.2183  .0036   0.1099  .0095  
499250= −kβ    .1570   .0103   -.2277  .0034   0.0707  .0101  
500>kβ    .1648   .0105   -.2476  .0022   0.0828  .0105  
EPZβ    -.0727   .0652   0.0061   .0715   0.0666   .0627  
11≤k  in EPZ ( )
11−γ    -.0792   .0653   -.0376   .0635   0.1168   .0671  
12=k  in EPZ ( )12γ    -.0634   .0885   -.0275   .0885   0.0909   .0849  
13=k  in EPZ ( )13γ    -.1260   .0873   0.0550   .1061   0.0710   .0868  
15=k  in EPZ ( )15γ    .0202   .1040   -.0955   .0893   0.0753   .0940  
16=k  in EPZ ( )16γ    -.1262   .0919   -.0430   .0973   0.1692   .0983  
17=k  in EPZ ( )17γ    -.1004   .0993   0.0054   .1142   0.0950   .0974  
18≥k  in EPZ ( )
18+γ    .0034   .0677   -.0571   .0609   0.0537   .0610  
Note: Dependent variable: Indicator variable taking the value of 3 if employment increases, 2 if employment is the 
same and 1 if employment reduces. Logistic regression estimates give. Base case is 14 workers for a nonEPZ firm. 
Bold values are significant at 5%. 
 
  Estimate is Model 2 with shrinking below 1−tL  as base outcome.  
 Variables regrouped to test for differences in employment growth rate below and above the threshold.  
  
   Shrink   stay the same   Grow  
  1)=( ity    2)=( ity    3)=( ity   
 Variables   Marginal 
Effect  
 Std error  Marginal 
Effect 
 Std Error  Marginal Effect Std error  
            
 L ≤−1t 13 in EPZ 
)( EPZkk βγβ ++ −−   
 .24−    .01    .20    .02    0.04    0.02   
L ≤−1t 13 in nonEPZ )( −kβ    .14−    .01     .24    .01    .10−    0.01   
L ≤−1t 14 in EPZ )( EPZβ    .07−    .06    .01   .08    0.10    0.06   
L ≤−1t 14 in nonEPZ )( 14β    −    −    −    −    −    −   
L ≥−1t 15 in EPZ 
)( EPZkk βγβ ++ ++   
 .01−    .01    .22−    .01    0.23    0.01   
L ≥−1t 15 in nonEPZ )( +kβ    .08    .01   .17−    .01    0.09    0.01   
Test for differences in growth rate between groups ( 3)=ity   
 Hypothesis   Estimate 1   
 
0=  :14)=(L  versus)13(L
with firms nonEPZbetween  rategrowth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t −−− ≤ kβ
  
 
(167.96)
0.01−
  
 
0=:14)=(L  versus) 15(L
 withfirms nonEPZbetween  rategrowth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t +−− ≥ kβ
  
 
(141.85)
0.09
  
 
0=)( :13)(L  versus) 15(L
 withfirms nonEPZbetween  rategrowth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t −+−− −≤≥ kk ββ
  
 
(332.18)
0.19
  
 0=  :) 14=(L and 13)(L
 withfirms EPZbetween  rategrowth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t −−−− +≤ kk γβ
   (3.27)
.02−
  
 0=EPZ)in  14=(L and EPZ)in  15(L
 withfirmsbetween  rategrowth  employmentin  sdifferencefor Test 
1t1t ++−− +≡≥ kk γβ
   (0.85)
0.17
  
 )()(  :) 13(L  versus) 15(L
 withfirms EPZbetween  rategrowth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
1t1t −+−+−− −+−≤≥ kkkk γγββ   
 
(12.16)
0.19
  
 
0=)(
}1315{
}1315{
)firms nonEPZ and EPZfor   threshold theabove and
below rategrowth  employmentin  differencefor Test 
11
11
−+
−−
−− −≡⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
≤−≥−
≤−≥≡
kk
tt
tt
nonEPZinLnonEPZinL
EPZinLinEPZL γγ
  
 
(32.75)
0.004−
  
Note: Independent variables are dummy variables for firms that belong to stated groups only. Base case is 14 workers for a nonEPZ firm. Bold values are 
significant at 5%.  
(1) Chi squared values reported in parentheses. 
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